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In a series of papers and articles beginning 1n 1983, Julian Cobbing has offered
a radical, and often provocative, critique of the "mfecane" as the pivotal
concept of the history of southern Africa 1n the first half of the nineteenth
century.' He asks vigorous new questions about everything from the Identity of
the "Fingoes" 1n the south and the "Mantatee hordes" on the Mghveld, to the
extent of the slave trade around Delagoa Bay. Cobbing's work has stimulated a
host of graduate studies on these topics, and has prompted a number of
established students of the period to reassess aspects of their earlier work.2
The sheer scope of the critique 1s, however, also the source of Its greatest
weakness. In particular, Cobbing has come under fire for making sweeping
generalisations and employing Imprecise per1od1sat1on.
Nowhere 1s this criticism more pertinent than 1n relation to the lynchpin of
Cobbing's thesis, namely, his view of Shaka-the-monster as a European Invention
to mask'Illegal labour procurement activities and land occupation. In this
paper, I focus on Cobbing's reconstruction of the making of the Shaka myth. My
purpose 1s to disentangle the elaborate weave of Cobbing's powerful Insights and
Implausible conspiracy theories. I suggest that while Cobbing's critique 1s
extremely valuable, especially 1n the way that 1t forces historians to question
many of the assumptions with which they have for too long been extremely
1
 J. Cobbing, "The case against the mfecane", unpublished seminar paper,
University of Cape Town, 1983; 1n revised form "The case against the mfecane",
unpublished seminar paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1984; "The myth
of the mfecane", unpublished seminar paper, University of Durban-
Westville, 1987; "The mfecane as alibi: thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo",
Journal of African History, 2, 1988, pp. 487-519; "Jettisoning the mfecane
(with perestroika)", unpublished paper presented together with John Wright's
"Political mythology and the making of Natal's mfecane", to a seminar at the
University of the Witwatersrand In 1988 entitled "The mfecane: beginning the
Inquest"; and most recently, "Grasping the Nettle: The Slave Trade and the
Early Zulu", paper presented to the workshop on Natal and Zulu land 1n the
Colonial and Precolonial periods, University of Natal, P1etermar1tzburg, 1990.
i
 See the work of Cobbing's students, notably J. Richner, "The withering
away of the Mifaqane': or a change of paradigm", B.A. Hons. essay, Rhodes
University, 1988; A. Webster, "An Examination of the 'F1ngo Emancipation1 of
1835", paper presented to the African Studies seminar, University of Cape
Town, 1990; and that of John Wright on the genesis of the mfecane myth 1n
Natal, notably "Political Mythology and the Making of Natal's Mfecane",
Canadian Journal of African Studies, 23, 2, 1989, pp.272-291. Also see
E.Eldredge, "The 'Mfecane' Reconsidered: The Origins of Violence 1n South
Africa, ca. 1800-1830", Paper presented to SERAS, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, 1990 (subject to citation restrictions). In April 1991 a
panel discussion on the mfecane was held at the University of Natal, Durban.
A large range of new studies, reassessments and responses will be presented
at a workshop to be held at the University of the Witwatersrand In September
1991, on "The 'Mfecane1 Aftermath: towards a new paradigm". Papers on offer
cover everything from the analysis of early nineteenth-century cannibalism
narratives to the "Great Trek Revisited".
comfortable, he falls fundamentally to come to grips with the full complexity of
his primary object of study, past historical myth-making processes.
Cobbing Identifies four key elements 1n the notion of the mfecane as most
commonly espoused: firstly, "a self-generated Internal revolution" within
northern Ngun1-speak1ng societies which culminated 1n the 1820s 1n the
regionally-dominant Zulu power led by a savage despot, Shaka; secondly, attacks
by the Zulu on neighbouring chiefdoms which forced the latter to flee their land
and which, 1n turn, displaced other cMefdoms still further afield; thirdly, a
"cataclysmic period of black-on-black destruction" (Including cannibalism)
leading to the depopulation of the Interior of South Africa; with all of this
culminating, fourthly, in the restoration of security with the advent of the
Europeans. (Jobbing's observation that this explanation for the depeopUng of
much of the Interior, and for the arrangement of the African Inhabitants of
southern Africa 1n a surrounding "horseshoe", serves to legitimate white
occupation of the land and the Ideology of separate development, 1s not new. But
the case that he presents for the selection of Its component elements, and how
the myth became established, 1s challenging.
The central claim of (Jobbing's critique 1s that by making "Shaka" the motor
of the mfecane, white writers were able to ignore or cover up the devastating
impact of white penetration Into South Africa in the early nineteenth century.
He suggests that this Included the effects of a massive demand for labour in the
form of slaves or variants thereof ("apprentices", "refugees" and so on) from
both the Cape Colony in the south, which was experiencing a labour supply problem
following the ending of the British slave trade 1n 1807, and from Delagoa Bay 1n
the north, an Increasingly important slaving port 1n the 1800s/
Cobbing argues that the various elements of mfecane theory were established
as part of an "alibi" by early missionaries like Hoffat and Melvill, traders like
Fynn and Farewell, and colonial officials like Somerset, all anxious to obscure
aspects of their activities and policies 1n relation to the early nineteenth-
century African inhabitants of southern Africa - 1n particular their roles 1n
resolving these problems of labour supply. The components of mfecane theory, he
argues, were subsequently taken up, developed and combined by a generation of
settler historians like Theal, Cory, Walker and Ellenberger, eager to argue the
case for "the empty land" 1n response to the 1913 Land Act. After the Second
World War, Cobbing continues, the explanatory scope of mfecane theory was widened
by apartheid historians to explain "the natural 'pluralism' of black societies
and how they self-sequestered themselves Into proto-Bantustans In the time of
Shaka"5
3Cobbing, "The mfecane as alibr, pp. 487-488.
*For Cobbing's argument on the slave trade, see "Grasping the Nettle",
pp 5-20. This aspect of Cobbing's argument builds on the work of
Patrick Harries, notably "Slavery, social Incorporation and surplus
extraction: the nature of free and unfree labour 1n South-East Africa",
Journal of African History, XXII, 1981, pp. 309-330.
5Cobbing, "The mfecane as alibi", p. 519.
(Jobbing's energetic Interrogation of the available sources and his wide-
ranging, highly Inter-connected review of the central conflicts and forces at
work across southern Africa offer an exciting reinterpretation of early
nineteenth-century southern African history. His demonstration of the "spatial
and chronological teleologies of mfecane theory", the collapse of the "shunting
sequence" of population movements, and the absence of "hard evidence for Zulu
agency" for many of Its key events, are convincing reasons for "Jettisoning" the
"macro-theory or macro-myth of the mfecane" as an explanation for the
depopulation of the Interior." We are obliged to agree that the mfecane 1s an
"Afrocentric" explanation of events during the period which Ignores or covers up
massive white, or Imperial, agency, and to concur that, as "a multiple concept
around which to organise the history of the era, the mfecane 1s devoid of
analytical usefulness".'
But Cobbing's reconstruction of the making of the myth of the mfecane 1s as
Eurocentric as the mfecane theory 1s Afrocentric. For Cobbing, the history of
the period 1s entirely determined by settler and capitalist forces. No space 1s
allowed, for example, for the choices made by Africans 1n their responses to the
demands for labour exerted on both their southern and northern perimeters. No
attention 1s given to the effects of 1ntra-Afr1can political and economic
dynamics, nor to other economic factors, either long term - such as the Impact of
the Introduction of maize - or short term, localised phenomena like drought,
famine or disease.
Equally problematic 1s the Eurocentrism of the manipulation of the history
which he highlights. Cobbing argues that the construction of the mfecane as an
"alibi" for the more criminal of their activities, was wholly determined by the
Interests and views of whites. The early whites, and their settler heirs, simply
"Invented" the relevant components of the mfecane myth as they saw fit, and as
best suited their needs.
But as any affidanado of crime literature knows well, a good alibi - one
that excites little, suspicion or 1s likely to hold up under Investigation - Is
well-grounded 1n the facts as far as they can be determined and 1s Invested with
detail that 1s convincing. It appeals to the general preconceptions of U s
Interrogators, Its victims and Its perpetrators, and 1t only deviates from the
actual events 1n certain crucial respects. That the mfecane has been proven to
be a good alibi 1s attested to by Its resilience over time. This 1s not a result
of simple-mindedness, but 1s a consequence rather of the embeddedness 1n the
myth, and 1n Its key features, of African views of the past, notably that of
Internal African agency.
By arguing that Europeans "Invented" the myth of the mfecane and U s
component elements, Cobbing assumes that the production of history 1n the
nineteenth century was carried out by whites only, Independent of the historical
consciousness of the Africans with whom they were 1n dally contact. The
Implication of this assumption 1s that nineteenth-century Africans were without
an Intellectual history of their own and that they were unable, or at least
6Cobb1ng, "The mfecane as alibi", p. 518.
'cobbing, "Grasping the Nettle", p.3.
failed, to produce history in the service of complex ideological objectives
worthy of comparison with their European neighbours, nor significant enough for
the latter to need to take cognizance of. In other words, (Jobbing's case against
the mfecane 1s doubly Eurocentric: both in terms of his characterisation of the
events and forces of the time, and 1n terms of their production 1n historical
discourse. In so doing, Cobbing repeats the separation of black and white
history 1n as serious a way as the myth of the mfecane itself does. In effect,
Cobbing simply replaces the master narrative of Shaka-as-cause-of-v1olence with
that of slave-trade-as-cause-of-violence. In so doing, he fails to harness his
powerful insights regarding the mfecane myth in the service of an analysis that
takes proper cognizance of regional developments and local particularities.
My case then, is not for the mfecane, but against the case as presented by
Cobbing. In the rest of this paper I challenge his assumptions about the
European manufacture of the mfecane, characterised as the perfection by settler
propagandists of "their piece de resistance, *the mfecane', combining partly
contextualised facts, half-truths, and lies, both of commission and omm1ss1on".J
I suggest that this invocation of conspiracy depends on an untenable notion of
European interests as monolithic and as unchanging over time. I attempt to give
substance to my challenge through an exploration of a central element in the
mfecane theory, that of Shaka.8
In the paper, I focus in detail on the period in which Cobbing posits the
image of Shaka was established which became central to mfecane theory, namely,
the 1820s. Cobbing asserts that from the first it was in the interests of the
white traders to promote Shaka as a tyrannical despot. I try to demonstrate that
this sweeping claim misses crucial changes 1n the circumstances of the early
traders, and completely ignores the productions of Shaka taking place In
contemporary African settings. My proposition is that at various times, the
Shaka in different European perorations took cognizance of the many Shaka's that
were heard in African voices, and vice-versa. It was out of this process that
 fc
emerged the "Shaka" that became central to mfecane theory.
The paper examines the image of Shaka promoted in the Cape by the Port Natal
traders 1n the 1820s and distinguishes between the versions sponsored by
different factions within the Port Natal community. It looks at the way that
these productions shifted during the period under review in response to specific
8Cobbing,"Grasping the Nettle", p. 1.
9In his paper published 1n 1989 1n the Canadian Journal of African
Studies (see reference In note 1) John Wright aligned himself closely with the
main points of Cobbing's arguments on the Natal/Zulu material under review 1n
this paper. Following a warm debate on the topic at the Conference on
Enlightenment and Emancipation, held at the University of Natal, Durban, 1989,
at which both Wright and I presented papers, Wright has refined his arguments
regarding trader politics, and avoids many of the errors and generalisations
which characterise his own earlier article, and the work of Cobbing. For his
revised position see his doctoral dissertation "The Dynamics of Power and
Conflict in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region 1n the late Eighteenth and Early
Nineteenth Centuries: A Critical Reconstruction", Wits, 1990, especially the
final chapter.
developments 1n the traders' commercial ventures, and 1n their relationship with
the Zulu court and their African neighbours. In sharp contrast to Cobbing's
argument, the paper suggests that before the Zulu king's death 1n late 1828, the
traders1 presentation of Shaka was that of benign patron. There were two
exceptions to this, and these arose 1n response to the particular financial
difficulties which one of the traders, James King, faced at two specific moments
in time. The paper shows that 1n the Cape, King came to be seen as manipulative
and unreliable. His two negative depictions of Shaka were discredited 1n the
eyes of both the colonial administration and the general public, and did not,
before 1829, establish a negative Image of Shaka 1n the Colony.
As was the case with the traders' Images of Shaka, different versions of
Shaka were promoted by different Interest groups within the Zulu kingdom and the
Natal area, and these also shifted over time 1n response to changing
circumstances. The paper locates the origins of Shaka's Image as a tyrant both
In versions of Shaka current amongst disaffected elements 1n the Zulu kingdom 1n
the 1820s, as well as 1n the picture of a despot painted by the Zulu authorities
themselves. It suggests that the traders' productions of Shaka were not simply
manifestations of the view of Shaka that most directly suited their material
interests, but were also shaped by the form and content of the various African
views which they encountered and with which they Intersected during their stay 1n
Natal.
Finally, I look at the production of Shaka by African communities on the Cape
frontier. Examination of the correspondence amongst the colonial officials
concerned with the frontier in 1827-28 reveals that the Idea that Shaka posed a
threat to the stability of the Cape, and was the agency behind a "shunting
sequence" of "tribal attacks", originated independently of the Natal traders
amongst the frontier communities who then relayed their Information to the
colonial authorities.
EUROPEAN PRODUCTIONS OF SHAKA IN THE 1820s
The Cape's Shaka before 1824
The first productions of Shaka to percolate down to the Cape Colony were
contained 1n the reports of visitors to Delagoa Bay, then the port nearest to the
Zulu kingdom. In 1822, Henry Francis Fynn joined the Jane, a vessel belonging to
the Cape mercantile concern, Nourse and Company, trading with Delagoa Bay. In a
stay that overlapped with that of a British naval squadron under Captain
W.F.W. Owen, Fynn spent some six months at Delagoa Bay, and undertook extensive
exploration of Its Immediate surrounds. In the Diary, Fynn records that he heard
of "the Zulu tribe, under Shaka, [who] were a very powerful nation", and
intrigued, arranged a visit to a Zulu homestead and would have continued on to
Shaka's capital 1f the distance had not proved prohibitive. While much of Fynn's
account of his visit to Delagoa Bay was clearly written long after the event, and
was extensively informed by subsequent Information and attitudes which he
acquired, it 1s clear that the Impression of Shaka which he gleaned at Oelagoa
Bay excited his curiosity and was not threatening.10 By 1823 reports of the
prospects of trade with the Zulus received from Nourse and Co, were so favourable
that Francis Farewell was able to secure significant financial backing by Cape
merchants for an exploratory voyage to Delagoa Bay and Natal. Farewell chartered
two ships, the Julia and the brig, the Salisbury, under James King. When they
arrived at Delagoa Bay, Owen's vessel, the Leven, was 1n port, and Farewell went
aboard to Interview Owen. The Interview contained nothing to discourage him and
he and King Immediately proceeded to the coast of Natal 1n an attempt to open
communications with Shaka. They failed to land successfully, and In the
process sustained damage to their ships, lost two boats and a considerable amount
of their trade goods.12
Undaunted, Farewell returned to the Cape, negotiated new financing with
Messrs. Hoffman and Peterssen, hired a large party to accompany him - Including
the young Fynn - and engaged two ships to transport the party and their cargo to
Natal. In response to a request from the Governor of the Cape for Information
regarding his activities, Farewell reported that the prospects for trade from a
base at Port Natal were excellent, the "natives hav[1ng] requested that we come
and traffic with them...".
10
 J. Stuart and D.M. Malcolm (eds.), The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn,
Pietermaritzburg, 1950, see chapters one and two, and especially p. 42.
11See Fynn, Diary, pp. 51-53, p. 56, note 1; J. King to the Sec. for
Colonies, the Earl of Bathurst, 10 July, 1824, G.H. 1/39, pp. 45-58; J. King,
South African Commercial Advertiser, 11 July, 1826; for details of Farewell's
engagement of King see N.C.D. 35/8, pp. 534-541. Owen's journal was edited
and published as Narrative of voyages to explore the shores of Africa, Arabia
and Madagascar, 1n 1833. The publication Includes material drawn from other
sources, 1s heavily edited and cannot be treated as an accurate reflection of
Owen's views 1n 1822. An account of Shaka, attributed to Farewell writing
1n 1825, is reproduced In Owen's text and must be treated with the same
caution. One of Owen's officers, T_ Boteler, also published an account of
Owen's trip 1n 1835 {Narrative of a voyage of discovery to Africa and Arabia),
For some Idea of Owen's contemporary opinion of Shaka and the Zulu, see
John Philip's report to Acting Colonial Secretary, P.G. Brink, 13 April, 1824
(P.R.O., C O . 48/62) believed to be based on Owen's information (see Governor
of the Cape, Lord Charles Somerset to Bathurst, 22 April, 1824, G.H. 23/7,
pp. 144-145), 1n which Philip comments optimistically on the prospects for
trade with the Interior.
1zThe precise nature of this setback in commercial terms 1s difficult to
assess. The venture was well-Insured and substantial claims were made.
Unfortunately, the extent of the final settlement is not known. In his letter
to Somerset, 1 May, 1824, Farewell noted that the earlier expedition
"sustained a most considerable loss" (CO. 211, pp. 222-225). It 1s clear
that for his next expedition Farewell was obliged to seek other financial
backing. See N.C.D. 35/9, pp. 67-75, 117-126, 144-149, 573-578, 585-589.
"Farewell to Somerset, 1 May, 1824, C O . 211, pp. 222-225; N.C.D. 35/9,
pp. 573-578, 585-589. It is not clear from Farewell's letter who precisely
"the natives" were, I.e. whether he means the Zulu authorities or the
By June,.1824, both ships had landed their cargoes successfully, and Farewell
and Fynn had travelled overland to meet Shaka themselves. In the first report
from the Port Natal settlement to the Cape, Farewell confirmed the expectations
that Shaka would make a good trading partner. He depicted the Zulu king as
enthusiastic about the settlement, and well-disposed towards the British. He
noted that his companions found the orderliness, manners and customs of the Zulu
both "aston1sh[1ng] and pleas[1ng]V4 Cape opinion of Shaka could not have been
better. For the next two years not one single negative report concerning the
king emanated from Port Natal.
The traders' Shaka. 1824-1827
CobbIng's characterisation of the Port Natal settlement and the objectives of
the traders 1s a central aspect of his wider thesis about the Invention of the
mfecane myth. His argument can be broken down Into two parts: his reconstruction
of what the traders were actually up to at Port Natal; and secondly, how they
represented their actions and those of the Zulu king.
Cobbing claims that the Port Natal traders were slavers, and that all
evidence of this aspect of their activities has been systematically excised from
their accounts of the period.15 He uses two arguments to support these
assertions: firstly, he argues for the existence of a vibrant slave trade
centered on Delagoa Bay and the Involvement of chiefdoms between the bay and Port
Natal 1n slaving through the Portuguese port. He then locates the Port Natal
entrepot firmly in this context. Secondly, he rereads the traders1 narratives 1n
search of hidden slaving activities.
Reconsideration of both of these arguments suggests that they do not support
his conclusions. Firstly, 1t cannot be assumed that the region was the slaving
vortex that Cobbing implies. The evidence which he marshals for a slave trade of
significant volume through Delagoa Bay while enormously suggestive, 1s by no
means conclusive. The major problem is Cobbing's failure to consider sources
which contradict his claims. One instance of this must suffice to make the
point, though others are available for review15: Cobbing claims that 1n the
period after the Napoleonic Wars when slave exports off the southern coast of
Inhabitants of the bay area; for continued reports of Shaka's "friendly
disposition" arriving at the Cape 1n this period see W.H. Lys, Officer of
Health, to Brink, 12 April, 1824, P.R.O., CO., 48/62.
14Farewell to Somerset, 6 September, 1824, C O . 211, pp. 650-651,
656-657.
lsCobbing, "Grasping the Nettle", p. 25.
16See, for example, Cobbing's assertion that in 1827 Cane supplied slaves
to a schooner at Delagoa Bay.("Grasping the Nettle", p. 27.) In my view the
document cited as evidence is open to a very different reading. In such cases
it is incumbent on the historian to discuss the quality of the evidence and
the context of the document.
Mozambique shot up, Delagoa Bay enjoyed preeminence as a supplier" His evidence
for Delagoa Bay enjoying "additional priority" 1n this period Is a reference to a
letter from Owen, captain of the Leven, In point of fact this letter does not
assert that the slave trade at Delagoa Bay was especially active, but that 1t
might become so 1n the future. "The Port", Owen writes, "1s more convenient than
any other for direct communication with Brazil, and If the temptation to make
slaves be permitted to be held out to the natives, ... they wJJJ. cut one
another's throats without mercy, and the whole country will be depopulated 1n a
very few years. 8(my emphases) The context of Owen's speculations and opinions
regarding the slave trade are further worth noting: this letter, and other of
his communications13, take the form of strong motivations for the British
government to oust the Portuguese from the southern Mozambiquean coast, as part
of a strategy to secure British sea routes and the Cape Colony. To this end,
Owen emphasised the Iniquities of Portuguese trading practices. In this context,
his emphasis on the relative lack of slaving at Delagoa Bay 1s noteworthy, an
opinion not considered 1n the Cobbing thesis: "There are", Owen comments, "very
few slaves exported from this place and the natives have a decided aversion to
the trade".20 Closer attention to specific sources, their tight per1od1sat1on
and investigation of the contexts of their production 1s clearly Imperative 1n
any attempt to assess the volume the slave trade. They are essential
prerequisites to the making of well-founded connections between the slave trade
and wider regional politics, and more specifically, the trading activities of the
Port Natalians.
Cobbing's argument that the southern Tsonga, Mthethwa, Ndwandwe and the
Zulu , amongst others, were active slavers, 1s based on evidence even more
tenuous. The first source 1s the presence of Portuguese soldiers Inland, on
"expeditions", which, Cobbing claims - without a shred of further evidence - "can
^Cobbing, "Grasping the Nettle", pp. 4-5. Cobbing claims further that
in 1822-23 the main trading Item moving through the Bay was slaves. He cites
as his sources "the relevant evidence " 1n two volumes of Theal's Records of
South East Africa, without page references, and Fynn's Diary. The latter 1s
a source, like so many others, which he elsewhere discredits thoroughly.
Dismissal of some of the major sources for the period as white "forgeries",
and subsequent citation of them, 1s a characteristic feature of Cobbing's
argument, and 1s subject to two criticisms. The first 1s that such texts are
significantly more complex constructs, and are shaped by a more complex set
of Interests than Cobbing allows. (See my more detailed discussion below of
precisely the same problems 1n Cobbing's treatment of James Stuart.) The
second is that, having Indicted such sources, subsequent citation of them
requires specific argumentation as to why they may be relied on 1n relation
to a particular matter.
I8G.M. Theal (ed.), Records of South-East Africa, London, 1903, vol. 1x,
p. 37.
^Records of South-East Africa, vol. 1x, pp.32-35, 37-39.
^Records of South-East Africa, vol. 11, p. 487.
^Cobbing, "Grasping the Nettle", p.8.
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only have been for slaves . At the very least, Cobbing needs to consider the
possibility that they were engaged 1n securing traffic 1n Ivory and cattle, both
we 11-documented Items of trade between these cMefdoms and Delagoa Bay." The
second source 1s evidence that Cobbing 1s yet 1n expectation of one day
uncovering:
Other powerful Tsonga chiefs ...had fearsome reputations and are likely
to have been Involved 1n the slave trade, although evidence has not yet
come to my hand."2'
Finally, Cobbing's argument regarding the slave trade as the context 1n which
Port Natal must be viewed is based on the level of warfare and violence 1n the
region. This 1s ascribed, without evidence beyond that already discussed above,
to the vicissitudes of raiding "presumably with slaves"."(my emphasis) The
teleology 1s surely untenable, and casts serious doubts over Cobbing1s methods
more generally. Nonetheless, there are Indications that some chiefdoms did trade
prisoners taken 1n war through Delagoa Bay, and this does warrant further
Investigation." What 1s at Issue, and which remains to be established with any
reliability 1s the volume of this trade.
What evidence does Cobbing present for Involvement of the Port Natal traders
specifically 1n the supposedly vibrant regional slave trade? Cobbing sets the
scene by claiming that Port Natal was at the time of the traders' arrival
"already a fairly well-known slaving port"2' but gives no reference; of the
traders' participation in certain of Shaka's campaigns, he claims that "[t]here
can be no doubt that these raids were for s l a v e s , and again cites no evidence.
Other scholars" have argued that very different reasons underlay the traders'
armed forays at Shaka's behest - such as the growing Insecurity of the Zulu
rulers at this time leading Shaka to insist that his clients, Including the
traders, provide military support - and again, it 1s Incumbent on Cobbing to
consider these arguments.
22Cobb1ng, "Grasping the Nettle", p.9.
23D.W. Hedges, "Trade and politics 1n southern Mozambique and Zululand 1n
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries", Ph.D, SOAS London, 1978; A.
Smith, "The Trade of Oelagoa Bay as a Factor in Nguni Politics, 1750-1835" 1n
L.M. Thompson (ed.) African Societies, London, 1969, chapter eight.
24Cobb1ng, "Grasping the Nettle", p.10.
25Cobbing, "Grasping the Nettle", p.10.
26See, for example, the comments on p.48 of Fynn's Diary to this effect.
2TCobb1ng, "Grasping the Nettle", p.26.
28Cobbing, "Grasping the Nettle", p.27.
^Roberts, The Zulu Kings, pp.100-103;C.A. Hamilton, "Ideology, oral
traditions and the struggle for power 1n the early Zulu kingdom", HA, W1ts,
1986, p. 363.
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Finally, Cobbing claims that "[sihips calling at Port Natal 1n 1827-7[s1c]
could easily have taken out slaves".3tr The claim 1s based on the arrival of
ships at Port Natal after the attacks (I.e. slave raids, 1n his terms) on the
Ndwandwe and Khumalo. Not only 1s there nothing to Indicate that the traders
returned to Port Natal with prisoners, but all evidence points to Shaka as
controlling the timing of the two attacks. One wonders how the traders managed
to orchestrate the timeous arrival of the ships. In fact, the correlation in
timing was not as neat as Cobbing claims 1t was. This Cobbing explains away as
being the result of "a scrambled chronology in Fynn's material...to prevent the
historian from putting two and two together".31 No source of an alternative
chronology Is cited. In fact, Isaacs, another of the traders, confirms that the
"raid" concerned took plflce 1n June 1826, while arrival of the ship concerned can
be dated to April, 1826.3Z In other words, Fynn's chronology 1s borne out by
other sources, and Cobbing's is Incorrect. More Importantly, at least one of the
ships concerned was the Helicon, a British naval vessel! Cobbingfs persistent
failure to consider the counterfactuals to his case, is the greatest weakness of
his argument." Although the evidence for the involvement of the traders 1n
slave trading is insufficient for 1t to bear the weight placed on 1t by Cobbing's
argument, the possibility that the traders occasionally traded in slaves cannot
be ruled out. Nevertheless, the assertion that the traders were heavily involved
in slaving is inconsistent with the next element of Cobbing's argument, his claim
that the traders, and their backers at the Cape were keen to see the
establishment of a colony at Port Natal: an official British presence would
undoubtedly have nipped any slave trade in the bud.
It is my contention that not only is 1t unlikely that the traders were active
slave hunters, but also that their lobby for the establishment of a colony at
Port Natal only developed after 1828 1n response to the changed circumstances
that prevailed after the death of Shaka. Cobbing's misplaced assertion that the
traders sought to persuade the British to annex Natal in the 1820s skews our
understanding of the relations between Port Natal and the Zulu kingdom. Cobbing
posits that the desire to see a colony established 1n Natal was the reason for
the traders' obsessive discussions of the depredations of the Zulu king. While
it 1s clear that after the assassination of Shaka at least some of the traders
were eager to see the establishment of a colony, and that by that time they were
30Cobb1ng, "Grasping the Nettle", p.27.
3lCobb1ng, "Grasping the Nettle", n.217.
32N. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa, London, 1836,
reprinted Cape Town, 1970, p. 60; The Cape Town Gazette and African
Advertiser, 28 April, 1826.
33Thus, when he so suggestively draws our attention to the fact that
after leaving Natal, one of the traders, Nathanial Isaacs, went on to become
a slaver elsewhere, he should also tell us that another member of the trading
party, John Ross, alias Charles Rawden Maclean, later 1n life became an avid
anti-slaver. (S. Gray, "South African Fiction and a Case History Revised: An
Account of Research into Retellings of the John Ross Story of Early Natal",
Researches in African Literatures, vol.19, 4, 1988, pp.473-474.)
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unanimous 1n describing Shaka as a tyrant, 1n 1824-25 neither case prevailed. If
(Jobbing's attribution of motives to the traders 1s somewhat problematic, so Is
his argument that they demonized Shaka to promote their dual alms of slave trade
and colonisation. In fact, the Image of Shaka presented by the traders between
1824 and 1830 was nearly always benign - with two exceptions.
Cobbing describes Farewell's expedition as "a large colonising party" which
landed "1n the hope of creating a fait accompli for the only slightly Interested
Cape Government".34 Farewell's report to Somerset 1n 1824 contains references
which, taken at face value, may lend themselves to this Interpretation."
Farewell notes the circumstances of a "grant" of land to the traders by Shaka,
and describes conditions conducive to settlement. He suggested that these benign
conditions would provide a "few families" from the distressed settler community
1n the Cape with a "comfortable assylum [sic]... as a colony". When placed In
context, however, these comments resist Interpretation as an Insistent campaign
for the colonisation of Natal.
The context Includes that of Farewell's preoccupation with creating a viable
base for his trading venture. The small Port Natal community was experiencing a
crisis over the cultivation of agricultural products for their own consumption,
as well as a shortage of labour more generally.36 While there 1s nothing to
Indicate that the traders feared Shaka, Farewell was sensible of the small
settlement's vulnerability, and of the need for the traders to operate from a
secure and relatively self-sufficient base. It was on Farewell's agenda to
establish clearly in the minds of the Zulu the extent and nature of the traders'
power and commercial Interests. Moreover, by September, 1824, twenty members
3<Cobb1ng, "The mfecane as alibi", p. 490; "The myth of the mfecane",
pp. 11-12; The fait accompli Idea originates 1n the work of B. Roberts, The
Zulu Kings, London, 1974, see p. 138 1n particular. As evidence, Cobbing
cites Farewell's first communication with Somerset, without noting that
Farewell was not approaching Somerset but responding to a query from the
Governor; he also cites Fynn's comments that 1n retrospect he realised that
Farewell was going to stay longer than he said, but the remark does not
necessarily connote a campaign for colonisation. Neither 1s the latter borne
out by Farewell's contracts regarding the ships, which were for 15 months
only. (Notarised Affreightment Declaration, between James Gosling and F.G.
Farewell, 15 April, 1824, NCD 35/9, pp.573-578) In his discussion of Farewell
and King's motives for going to Natal, Fynn makes no mention of colonisation.
35Farewell to Somerset, 6 September, 1824, C O . 211, pp.650-651. Cobbing
does not, however, cite this document.
36Lt. E. Hawes to C.R. Moorsam, Commodore of the British fleet at the
Cape, 16 May, 1825, C O . 233, pp. 245-246. For the published report see The
Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 4 June, 1825.
3
*Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 15, 22, 24, 42, 52, 53, 71; also
see King's comments, South African Commercial AJvertiser, 11 July, 1826;
Farewell to Somerset, 6 September, 1824; also see correspondence between the
commander of the Helicon and the Cape administration regarding the first Zulu
visitor to the Cape (CO. 270, pp. 202-204).
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of the original party had left Port Natal, and still another ten desired to go,M
Farewell's suggestion that a "few families" could prosper 1n Natal was not a move
to encourage formal colonisation, but rather an attempt to maintain at Port Natal
the Infrastructure necessary for the prosecution of trade.
It would be equally problematic to read off from Farewell's claim to havi
received a land grant from Shaka a desire for British Intervention 1n Natal
Farewell had successfully negotiated access to the area around Port Natal with
Shaka, although obviously not on the terms or 1n the form 1n which he represented
1t 1n his report. The "grant" at this stage offered no Inducement to
colonisation 1n and of Itself, but 1t did serve to underwrite the security and
stability of the trading venture, and appealed to Farewell's backers 1n the Cape.
In fact, the report of the grant was sent first to them, and then forwarded on to
Somerset. °
In the meantime, the traders prospered, acquiring Ivory directly from Shaka,
from the amaMpondo country and from the Inhabitants 1n and around Port Natal.
In a report that was subsequently published 1n the Cape Gazette and African
Advertiser, Lieutenant Hawes, the officer commanding the York, which called 1n at
Port Natal in May, 1825, observed that the traders were "living on the best terms
of friendship with the natives and under the protection of king Inguos Chaka",
who, he noted, "professes great respect for white people". As Hawes reported,
"The success of the party 1n their mercantile speculations 1s believed to be the
extent of their expectations.42
38Hoffman and Peterssen to Moorsam, 9 March, 1825, C O . 233, pp.103-104.
^Cobbing, "Mfecane as alibi", p. 490.
^Farewell to Somerset, 6 September, 1824, C O . 211, pp. 650-651 and
656-657.
41Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 18, 22, 31; Fynn, Diary, pp. 110,
117.
42Hawes to Moorsam, 16 May, 1825, C O . 233, pp. 245-246. For the
publ 1 shed report see The Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser,
4 June, 1825. Hawes1 report was passed on to the Cape Governor, Somerset,
C O . 233, p. 244. Note also, for example, that when Farewell's backers,
Hoffman and Peterssen lost contact with him as a result of the wreck of the
Julia in late September, 1824, they were dilatory 1n contacting the
authorities, and once they did, expressed no alarm on behalf of the party at
Port Natal. Hoffman and Peterssen to Moorsam, 9 March, 1825, C O . 233,
pp. 103-104. The authors of this letter comment that they returned from Natal
because "the country and natives were different from what was told them". In
the Diary, Fynn Indicates that Peterssen was disappointed to find that Shaka's
residence was not built out of Ivory, and being corpulent and temperamental
that he was not fitted for the rigours of Shaka's kingdom (Chapter five).
Also see Moorsam's comments about their dilatoriness, Moorsam to Hoffman and
Peterssen, 17 March, 1825, encl. N.C.D. 25/11, pp. 765-783.
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But small storm clouds were gathering on the Port Natal horizon: Hawes also
commented on the traders' lack of a boat and supplies." Since their arrival 1n
Port Natal, the traders had only once been able to use the Julia to replenish
their supplies and transport their Ivory before 1t was lost off the Natal coast.
The cargo lost 1n the wreck of the Julia was 1n excess 1n value of the amount 1t
was Insured for. Coming on top of the previous losses (see p.6), this latest
disaster almost certainly meant that Farewell was beginning to experience
financial pressures on top of his supply problems.*'
It was at this point that James King re-entered the picture. Although he had
been on the earlier exploratory voyage with Farewell, he had done so 1n the
latter1s employ. He struggled to raise the necessary capital for a venture
Independent from Farewell. In the loss of the Julia, however, King saw an
opportunity for entering Into the trade at Port Natal. The motivation for Cape
capital to back him at this point consisted of two parts: the first was the
humanitarian aim of succouring Farewell's party now cut off for some time from
the Colony; the second, more commercial, aspect lay in the calculation that by
arriving with much-needed supplies and a vessel, King would be able to take over
the transport side of the venture, 1f not actually Insert himself Into the trade
Itself.46
King's expectations were dashed when his vessel, the Mary, was wrecked on
entering the bay at Port Natal 1n October, 1825, and Its cargo lost. King's
party suddenly found themselves entirely dependent on Farewell, even for their
sustenance. Undaunted, King tried another tack. The new arrivals set up camp 1n
a separate area of the bay and immediately set about building a ship. However,
their aim was not to be able to quit the shores of Natal, which they could have
done on any one of a number of ships that called in at Port Natal during their
sojourn there. Rather, the building of the ship offered a means of recouping
43Hawes, The Cape Town Gazette, 4 June, 1825.
WC.O. 233, p. 247; Hoffman and Peterssen to Moorsam, 9 March, 1825;
N.C.D. 35/11, pp. 765-783 and enclosures; N.C.D. 35/9, pp. 573-578.
45K1ng to Bathurst, 10 July, 1824, G.H. 1/39, pp. 45-58; Farewell to the
editor, South African Commercial Advertiser, 31 January, 1829.
46Nonetheless, King's expedition was not heavily capitalised, and drew on
credit as well as special concessions from the authorities. King to Somerset,
9 August, 1825 (CO. 3929, pp. 136-139); also the response from the colonial
authorities, Sir Richard Plasket, Chief Sec. to the Govt. to King,
12 August, 1825, (CO. 4853, pp. 393, 409; also see C O . 3929, pp. 184-185;
C O . 243, pp. 147-152; CO. 235, pp. 511-512; C O , 4853, p. 453; C O . 293,
pp. 1323-1326).
4
'lsaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 13, 18.
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losses, and of gaining a hold over Farewell who still lacked access to a much-
needed vessel.
However, the building of a boat was a lengthy undertaking. Isaacs1 account
makes it clear that King's party, of which he was a member, soon began to run
short of provisions. They had nothing much to trade for supplies, while
Farewell's party was constrained to husband Its resources. After King's first
visit to Shaka, together with Fynn and Farewell, the traders came away with
107 head of cattle; one solution to the problem of supplies was to survive by
Shaka's patronage. This King Initially tried to do by salvaging gifts for the
Zulu king such as the Mary's figurehead, but when Ingenuity 1n this area ran out,
his party was faced with a stark choice: either to be cut off from Shaka's
patronage, or to become Zulu clients - a course of action which King realised
would Involve military services.49
While the party hesitated over this Issue, their conditions declined still
further. Thus when, in April, 1826, the Helicon arrived at Port Natal, King took
passage aboard in order to proceed to the Cape to obtain a new cargo, leaving his
comrades in what Isaacs describes as a "miserable situation". '
Cobbing argues that the traders promoted a negative Image of Shaka at the
Cape in order to encourage British Intervention 1n Natal 1n the form of
colonisation.51 Although he generalises their source and timing, the Images to
8Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 25, 60; also see Farewell's
comments in the South African Commercial Advertiser, 31 January, 1829; King
to Bathurst, 10 July, 1824, G.H. 1/39, pp.45-58. In fact, the building of a
boat at Port Natal had been on King's agenda from the first, and to that end,
he had taken with him to Port Natal the necessary tools and a shipwright.
^Isaacs, Travel and Adventures, pp. 60, 64, 66.
5tlA section of King's party, under Norton, the mate of the Mary, gave up
the ship-building exercise, and In defiance of King, departed from the Cape
in the wrecked ship's longboat. Those who remained behind began to find 1t
impossible to obtain food or porters without Invoking Shake's name as a
threat. Things became particularly severe 1n the period immediately prior to
the traders1 crops being ready for harvest. Isaacs, Travels, pp. 27-28; 38;
41, 42, 47, 57, 64, 67-70; The Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser,
6 January, 1826, and 28 April, 1826; report of the mate of the late brig Mary,
J.E. Norton, to Sec. for Govt,, Sir Richard PIaskett, 19 January, 1826,
C O . 293, pp. 97-100.
The argument that the two stereotypes - "depopulated Natal and Shaka-
the-monster" - were designed to encourage settlement and British involvement
in Natal is in itself not convincing. Both stereotypes can be seen as
disincentives for colonisation. As good or better a case can be made to the
effect that the very opposite stereotype - a stable and orderly Zulu society
under the firm hand of a powerful king on the borders of the proposed colony
and the existence of a plentiful supply of labour, preferably rendered docile
by the conquering Zulu (especially in the face of the turbulent Cape frontier
and that Colony's labour problems) - would have constituted a significantly
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which he refers actually arise out of this and a subsequent visit by King to the
Cape visits.
Reports of the traders1 circumstances which Immediately preceded King's
arrival 1n the Cape, and Indeed, his own Initial remarks, contain no negative
references to Shaka or the Zulu. "The natives" were described as "harmless" and
as behaving "extremely well". So satisfied was the colonial administration
with the Intelligence at Its disposal for Natal and the attractiveness of
conditions there, that they had no hesitation In sanctioning proposed visits to
Natal by botanists, missionaries and the like.53 Thus, when King arrived 1n Port
Elizabeth in April, 1826, both the general public 1n the Cape and the colonial
authorities had only heard praise of Shaka." In his first public comments,
contained in an article 1n the South African Commercial Advertiser, King
continued 1n this vein, describing Shaka as obliging, charming and pleasant,
stern 1n public but good-humoured 1n private, benevolent, and hospitable."
In the meantime, however, King's attempts to raise money for another ship and
a cargo failed.- He was thus obliged to approach the colonial authorities for
assistance. In his application he resuscitated the claim that he wanted to
more powerful inducement to the British authorities. However, even had the
traders wished to encourage settlement, they could not have argued that labour
was plentiful, for it was not.
**Norton to Plasket, 19 January, 1826; The Cape Town Gazette and African
Advertiser, 28 April, 1826.
53See the requests of C.H. Wehdemann, (8 November, 1824, C O . 2659,
pp. 693-694; granted 9 November, 1824, C O . 2659, pp. 691-692, 695; C O . 4851,
p. 487; U.I.T. 15/9, p. 247) and James Whitworth and Samuel Broadbent
(4 March, 1825, C O . 230, pp. 375-378; and the response, C O . 4852, p. 488)
for permission to proceed to Natal.
5
*The Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 6 January and
28 April, 1826.
^South African Commercial Advertiser, 6 June, 1826.
56In May, King attempted to negotiate the purchase of a schooner on a
two-thirds mortgage. Pointing out that his finances were precarious, King
sought colonial aid with the financing by stressing that his object was to
assist his wrecked crew, or falling aid, he requested the use of a government
vessel. King was not allowed to bring Ivory with him on the Helicon from Port
Natal, despite Mrs. Farewell's request to the governor to allow an exception.
King to Plasket, 2 June, 1826, C O . 293, pp. 619-622; Elizabeth Farewell to
Somerset, 27 Dec. 1825, C O . 235, pp. 946-949. Amongst other things, King
also heard at this time of the failure of another of his schemes to come to
fruition. See G.H. 23/7, p. 401, concerning his lease on the Bird and Chaun
islands. Note that the Ordnance storekeeper at the Cape was pressing his
backer Collison for debt settlement, while ColHson himself was petitioning
the Lieutenant Governor of the Cape for relief. See C O . 293, p. 1319;
C O . 219, pp. 1317-1318.
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succour those left behind.5' When he heard on 7 June that even this appeal had
failed, King chose a new approach. In an article on the 11th June 1n the South
African Commercial Advertiser. King, for the first time, represented Shaka as a
"despotic and cruel monster".*8 On the basis of the threat posed by Shaka to the
apparently vulnerable "castaways" at Port Natal, he succeeded 1n rallying
sufficient support to fit out another vessel, the Anne, for a "rescue" mission,
and, 1n this way, King returned to Port Natal with a cargo of trade Items, and
Mrs. Farewell. As Roberts notes 1n a much neglected study that focuses on the
contradictions between the traders' pronouncements of Shaka's murderousness, and
their actions, Mrs. Farewell's Inclusion in the party makes "one suspect the
disparity between King's words and actions".60
Thus King's second article 1n the South African Commercial Advertiser, which
stands 1n marked contrast 1n content and style to his first article, cannot be
seen a bid to encourage colonisation, nor as yet another Instance 1n a stream of
"mendacious propaganda" about Shaka, but as a highly specific strategy pursued at
a particular moment. This Image of Shaka stands 1n marked contrast to his own
earlier statements, as well as to the reports of the other traders, notably
Farewell. The Cape authorities however, clearly set little store by King's
latest Intelligence on Shaka, and continued to sanction trips to Natal.61
Indeed, within months, King himself was obliged to try and repair the damage by
convincing his backers 1n Cape Town that Shaka, although a despot, "to do him
justice, is for a savage the best-hearted of his race".62
With King's cargo-laden return to Port Natal, the situation of his party
Improved dramatically.63 But conflict Immediately erupted between Farewell and
King. The tensions between'the two parties which prevailed before King's first
57CA., CO. 293/138.
^South African Commercial Advertiser, 11 June, 1826; note that this 1s
the same description that is ascribed to Farewell in J. Bird (ed.), Annals of
Natal, vol. 1, Pietermaritzburg, 1888, reprint Cape Town, 1965, p. 93, and
which was quoted in G. Thompson, Travels and Adventures 1n Southern Africa,
vol. 1, London, 1827, second edition, Cape Town, 1967, pp. 174-175.
59On 22 July, 1826, King, with the backing of one William Hollett hired
from John Thompson (Farewell's agent in the Cape), the Anne, and on the same
day appointed Thompson his agent as well. N.C.D. 25/14, pp. 145-155, 156-159;
N.C.D. 25/11, pp. 765-783.
60Roberts, The Zulu Kings, p. 98.
^Application by George Rennie and response, C O . 293, pp. 911-912;
C O . 4895, pp. 60-61.
6
*K1ngto "T", presumably Thompson, May, 1827, published in The Colonist,
3 January, 1828.
63Isaacs, for example, was able to resume the collection of curiosities,
an endeavour he had been obliged for some time to forgo because of the lack
of trade goods. See Travels and Adventurest pp. 70-71.
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trip to the Cape,.and the open conflict which ensued after his return, are
Ignored by Cobbing in his arguments about the Image of Shaka, but have
Implications for the specific views of Shaka which the traders promoted
subsequently. Even writers on the affairs of the traders who have taken note of
the split, have failed to find a satisfactory explanation. * Isaacs, one of the
major sources on the quarrel, noted that 1t was over "matters of a pecuniary
nature", and elaborated on a particular tussle between the two over the question
of under whose name trade goods sent to Shaka would proceed. Farewell, 1n a
letter to the South African Commercial Advertiser in January, 1829, claimed that
King had undermined him and attempted to exclude him from the trade."
These remarks are consistent with the thesis that King had proceeded to the
Cape on the understanding that he would there procure trade goods on Farewell's
behalf, If not on his own as well. This enabled him to tap Farewell's superior
credit at the Cape.6' All along, 1t had been King's aim to enter the Port Natal
trade on terms more advantageous to himself. Initially these had collapsed when
he lost all of his cargo in the wreck of the Mary. On his return to Port Natal
1n October, 1826, King sought to hold Farewell to ransom over the question of
supplies.
Farewell refused to co-operate with King, as did Cane and Ogle of his party,
although Fynn, previously one of Farewell's party, now began to play an
increasingly Independent role. Again, the answers for this are not hard to find
when the trading, rather than colonising, Interests of the traders are focused
on. Fynn was one of the most active amongst the traders, particularly 1n the
area south of Natal. He would have had none of Farewell's objections to "buying"
supplies from King, 1f not exchanging Ivory for them, and perhaps a greater need
for fresh supplies.
As has been argued above, the greatest difficulties experienced by the Port
Natal traders concerned the maintenance of a direct supply route to and from the
Cape. The financing of ships for the task Involved considerable expense, a
problem exacerbated by the succession of losses and the difficulty of negotiating
the sand bar at the entry to Port Natal." One option Investigated by King was
^Roberts, The Zulu Kings, pp. 99, 103-104. Roberts suggests that King
wanted to take over Farewell's grant of land from Shaka, but cites no evidence
for this. Note that Cobbing's treatment of the split 1s confined to a
discussion of divisions on the eve of Dhaka's assassination ("Grasping the
Nettle", p.28).
fi5Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 75-76.
S6Also see the report 1n the South African Commercial Advertiser,
27 December, 1828.
6?See note 59 above.
68King faced an added problem when his shipwright downed tools. For
evidence of continued problems of supply, see the journey of John Ross to
Delagoa Bay, and the traders' bartering for supplies with the Buckbay Packet.
Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 101, 102, 117.
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the location of an alternative port. The other was the opening up of a route
overland.69 It was at this time that King and Fynn (the trader with the most
southerly base) began actively to pursue a plan to open up a southern connection
with the Cape.'0 This was the logic underlying King's next Journey to Port
Elizabeth with two ambassadors from Shaka, and the attacks at much the same time
by Shaka and Fynn on the communities of Africans living 1n the area between the
southern reaches of the Zulu kingdom and the Colony.
This series of events has also been misinterpreted and little understood
largely because of the obfuscation caused by the thesis that the traders desired
to use Shaka's southern campaigns to generate fear at the Cape and 1n that way to
push the British authorities Into establishing a colony 1n Natal. Wright argues
that King went to the Cape to get recognition for his latest land concession from
Shaka, and "to agitate for the establishment of some kind of British authority at
Port Natal to give his claims effect".'1 In fact, King did not raise the Issue
of the land grant until the 29 July, 1828, that 1s, over two months after his
arrival at the Cape, and, significantly, at the lowest point 1n his negotiations
with the authorities. He used the grant to claim for himself the authority to
negotiate on Shaka*s behalf, something the authorities were expressly trying to
avoid. Had King's primary objective been to obtain land grant recognition, he
would surely have brought the original document with him, but he did not.
Instead he made a copy from memory - or so he claimed, for the existence of the
original, and of an original land grant, was later strenuously denied by another
of the traders, John Cane.'
King's plan, 1t seems, was less ambitious. A more likely reconstruction of
his objectives at this time 1s that he aimed to have Shaka support Fynn 1n
clearing the way between Port Natal and the Colony; through the extension of Zulu
rule, this would bring the area under efficient Zulu administration, thereby
creating conditions more conducive to the prosecution of trade. But King knew,
of course, that any attempt by Fynn and Shaka to subdue the Intervening
communities would cause alarm at the Cape.
Shaka was doubtless as eager to place the trade on a sound footing, and at
this time began to supply the traders with Ivory directly, as well as easing the
restrictions on their other trading Initiatives.'3 He was Interested in
fiSSee John Cane's deposition, 10 November, 1828, 1n which he asserts that
Shaka "wished government to procure him a road that his people might come
along with their sticks in their hands without assegaay or any other weapon
to see the white people" and that Shaka said "he would send no more Ivory by
sea but would collect some and send them to Faka's kraal (en route to the
Cape] ... and deliver them to an officer who should be sent down and from whom
he would expect a present 1n return...". G.H. 19/3, pp.388-415.
'
D
 By this time, moreover, Fynn's family were 1n Grahamstown.
^Wright, "The Dynamics of Power and Conflict", p.358.
?2See G.H. 19/3, pp.473-475 and 376-384.
™ , for example, Fynn's Diary, p. 131.
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developing the southern reaches of his kingdom for other reasons. With the
defeat of the Ndwandwe 1n 1826, the bulk of the Zulu army was freed for
redeployment 1n the south. It has also been argued that Internal disaffection at
this time placed Shaka 1n a position of wanting to cement and monopolise the
relationship with the traders, themselves based 1n the south. When Shaka mooted
a plan to send ambassadors to the Cape, King Immediately agreed.'*
The Cape's Shaka
The first move 1n the preparation of public opinion at the Cape for the plan to
open the overland route was the release by the traders' backers 1n Cape Town of a
letter from Port Natal for publication 1n the South African Commercial
Advertiser. In the letter, King praised Shaka, spelt out his plan for a
southern campaign, and stressed that Shaka's Intentions towards the colony were
peaceful. Thus, 1f anything, when King set sail 1n the newly completed Elizabeth
and Susan for the Cape, he did so with the aim of promoting a very positive Image
of Shaka. On his arrival at Port Elizabeth on 4 May, 1828, he continued to
stress "the friendly disposition of Chaka towards our nation", and the absence of
any threat to the Colony from Shaka's latest campaigns.'6
However, King had made a significant miscalculation. In the period between
his first (1826) and second (1828) visits, the colonial administration's policy
shifted from a concern with the opening up of new markets and strategic bases
beyond the Colony, to one of stabilising the Independent frontier chiefdoms and
containing expansion. By late 1827, Bourke stated that official policy was
to maintain those situated Immediately on our front 1n possession of
their country as long as by their friendly and peaceable conduct they
prove themselves deserving of our protection. This will be easiest and
cheapest way of preserving the colony Itself from plunder and
disquietude...
In terms of this policy, the colonial authorities could not countenance
Shaka's campaigns on or near the borders of the colony.'8 By the time King came
to compose a detailed written statement for the authorities on the purpose of the
T4
 Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 71; King to "T", presumably
Thompson, 27 May, 1827, published 1n South African Commercial /Wvertiser,
3 January, 1828.
*
5Farewel1 to "T", presumably Thompson, published 1n South African
Commercial Advertiser, 3 January, 1828.
to J. van der Riet, Civil Commissioner, Uitenhage, 10 May, 1828,
G.H. 19\3, pp.30-33.
^Richard Bourke to Lord Viscount Goderich, 15 October, 1827 (G.H. 23/8,
pp. 298-304).
I8By the 9th of May, King had been 1n contact with military officials in
Port Elizabeth from whom he would have learnt of this policy. (See
Commandant, F. Evatt to Lt. Col. Somerset, 9 May, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 35-36.)
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Zulu embassy, he was acquainted with the new policy. In his statement he
stressed the urgency of sending one of the ambassadors back to Shaka as soon as
possible to apprise Shaka and Fynn of this unexpected policy shift. To his
injunctions for speed, King added the puzzling comment that he had left hostages,
1n Shaka's hand to guarantee the safety of the Zulu ambassadors. It is clear
from the operations 1n the Mpondo country at this time, of one of the claimed
hostages, Fynn, that this was not the case/' However, King's claim lent an
added Impetus to the urgency of returning a messenger to Shaka, at the same
obscuring Fynn's role 1n a southern campaign which was Increasingly showing the
possibility of coming into direct confrontation with the British. It also
contrived to suggest that the traders' role 1n Shaka's campaigns was forced upon
them.80 Once this report was submitted, King waited to see whether his
communication regarding Shaka's peaceful intentions towards the colony would
result 1n a change in policy.
King was also waiting for the registration of the Elizabeth and Susan to be
completed by the Port Elizabeth port authorities. He anticipated that the boat,
once registered, would either begin plying regularly between Port Natal and the
Cape, thus alleviating the supply problem, or alternatively, 1f disposed of,
would provide him with the necessary capital to obtain a new cargo and transport
1t to Natal. During May, King was optimistic on both counts. His statement of
Shaka's friendly Intentions had filtered through to the frontier, while on the
basis of his positive intelligence regarding Shaka, the authorities sanctioned
the expedition of Messrs. Cowie and Green to the Zulu kingdom. Likewise, the
press assured the general public that there was nothing to fear from Shaka.8'
When, however, it appeared that the registration of the boat might be in
jeopardy, and the Cape authorities, already tardy 1n responding to the embassy,
appeared to want Shaka to bring his campaign to a halt, King attempted, once
again, to use the threat of Zulu hostility to achieve his ends. He declared that
1f his craft was not registered he would not risk sending it back to Natal with
the one Zulu ambassador whose arrival Shaka was anxiously awaiting. If Shaka did
not hear from his ambassador, he continued, the safety of the Colony could not be
guaranteed." The threat feel on deaf ears."
l9See the discussion in Roberts, The Zulu Kings, pp.129-136.
*°K1ng to Van der Riet, 10 May, 1828; see also the emphases on haste, and
1n particular on the urgency of the return of one of the chiefs 1n King's
anxious communication to Van der R1et, 24 May, 1828 (G.H. 19/3, pp. 39-42);
Fynn, Diary, pp. 141, 153. Fynn subsequently made the same use of the hostage
argument.
8lSee C O . 4888, p. 217; C O . 4893, p. 249; C O . 4895, pp. 312-313;
D.P. Francis, port captain, to Col. Bell, 9 May, 1828, and 23 May, 1828,
C O . 359, pp. 191-192, 198-199; Evatt to Lt. Col. Somerset, 9 May, 1828,
G.H. 19/3 pp. 35-36; The Colonist, May, June, 1828.
8
*King to Bourke, 6 June, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 48-53; King to
Van der Riet, 6 June, 1828 (G.H. 19/3, pp. 66-69); Van der Riet to Bell,
7 June, 1828 (U.I.T. 15/12, pp. 45-47).
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The colonial authorities refused to be drawn Into what they recognised as
King's machinations. A government representative, Major A.J. Cloete, was
despatched to Port Elizabeth to circumvent King and to deal directly with the
Zulu ambassadors. Cloete was Instructed to Inform the ambassadors that King
enjoyed no status 1n the eyes of the British authorities." Although at this
time Intelligence from the frontier Indicated that Shaka's army was advancing on
the frontier chiefs, there were no fears 1n the official mind that the Colony
would be attacked by Shaka.8* What they did fear was that a war north of the
frontier would send large numbers of refugees streaming Into the Colony.
Cloete's subsequent discussions with the Zulus did not alter the picture of
Shaka's Intentions towards the colony as peaceful and the tenor of the pertinent
official correspondence over the next two months Indicates that King's Image of
Shaka-as-monster had failed to take root. The policy of the colonial officials
was to meet with Shaka at the first possible opportunity to explain their
position with regard to the chiefdoms across the border, after which, they
believed, he would withdraw.86 Over the next two months, the Cape authorities
only became more sceptical of King, and what Cloete described as his "determined
perversion of facts".*' Likewise, reports 1n the press questioned the Idea that
Shaka was vengeful, describing him as "amiable" and as a better diplomat than the
British officials."
B 3C0. 4322, pp. 151-152. Nonetheless Bell took sufficient cognizance of
the threat to have the possibility of registration carefully checked out for
a loophole. (See G.H. 19/3, p. 54.)
*
4Bell to Cloete, 14 June, 1828, C O . 4893, pp. 255-357.
'^Minutes of the Cape Council of Advice, 21 Juno, 1828, A.C. 2, pp. 453-
460; Dundas to Bourke, 20 June, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 88-89.
86See Somerset to Dundas, 15 June, 1828, A.Y. 8/79, pp. 193-196, 189-199;
Shrewsbury to Somerset, 12 June, 1828, Somerset to Bell, 20 June, 1828,
G.H. 19/3, pp. 85-87; Dundas to Bourke, 20 June, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 88-91;
and deliberations of the Council of Advice 1n Cape Town, 21 June, 1828, A.C.
2, pp.453-60; Bell to Dundas, 21 June, 1828, C O . 4888, pp. 270-271; Cloete
to Bell, 27 June, 1828, G.H. V9/3, pp. 96-103. Also see P.R.O., C O . 48/124;
G.H. 19/3, pp. 92-95; C O . 4888, pp. 274-275.
87Cloete to Bell, 11 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 159-166. The colonial
authorities were extremely suspicious of King and his motives in bringing the
chiefs to the colony. They were also alert to the contradictions and shifts
in the account of things that he promoted. See Van der Riet to Bell,
7 June, 1828, U.I.T. 15/12, pp. 45-47.
88The Colonist, May-July, 1828. My Interpretation of public opinion at
this time differs radically from that of Roberts, whose account of wholesale
panic amongst the Cape settlers in response to scares about an invasion by
Shaka, 1s the root of Cobbing's mistaken per1od1sat1on of the Image of Shaka.
Nonetheless, it is probable that there were some rumours abroad to the effect
that Shaka Intended to attack the Colony.
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King's strategies were by no means exhausted and,until his departure in
August, he tried a range of other ploys to extort money out of the authorities as
well as to try to shore up his position 1n the eyes of the Zulu envoys, but all
of these were blocked by the perspicacious Cloete. The latter also put
considerable effort into exposing King's manipulations to the ambassadors,
indicating that the British government dissociated Itself from King, and
emphasising the colonial government's favourable disposition towards Shaka.*9
Perhaps King's most outrageous manoeuvre was to approach the Chief
Commissioner for Ultenhage, Van der R1et, 1n an attempt to circumvent Cloete, and
on the basis of reports of Shaka's imminent advance on the Xhosa chief Hintza, to
offer to broker an accord between Shaka and the Colony. With this ploy, King
tried for the last time to invoke a threatening Shaka, claiming that If he did
not intervene, both the Port Natal settlement and the Colony would be attacked by
the Zulu. Once again, the authorities remained unconvinced, with justification
it seems, for in the same week, King was claiming Shaka as a "friend of nearly
three years" to whose "humanity and kindness" he owed a great debt.50 By August,
as the situation on the frontier deteriorated, the colonial administration deemed
1t best to return the envoys to Shaka with assurances of friendship and a clear
statement of their determination not to countenance his southern attacks. The
embassy, including King, were returned to Natal aboard the naval vessel, the
Helicon. After their departure, the press continued to report favourably of
Shaka. When British forces thought, mistakenly, that they had engaged the Zulu
on the frontier, an editorial in The Colonist accused the commanding officer,
Dundas, of "gross violation of the law of nations".31
In fact, so "civilised" did the press view Shaka, that it was speculated that
he must be "of white extraction".82 In the same edition one correspondent
commented perceptively on the problem of Interpreting Shaka:
The character and objects of Chaka 1t is not to be expected should be
favourably represented by the tribes he had ruined, or threatened to
89K1ng to Cloete, 4 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 125-126; Cloete to King,
4 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 126-127; Cloete to Bell, 4 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3,
pp. 115-124; Cloete to King, 5 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 167-168; King to
Cloete, 5 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 16g-172; Cloete to King, 10 July, 1828,
G.H. 19/3, pp. 174-177; Bell to King, 11 July, 1828, C O . 4895, p. 336;
Cloete to Bell, 11 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 159-166; King to Cloete,
presumably 18 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 212-215; Cloete to King, 18 July,
1828, G.H. 19/3, p. 216; Frances to Bell, 25 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3,
pp. 248-263; Cloete to Bell, 29 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 258-251; King to
Cloete, 29 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 264-271; Cloete to Bell, 18 July, 1828,
G.H. 19/3, pp. 198-203; Cloete to King, 30 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 272-273;
King to Cloete, 30 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 274-281; also see C O . 4894,
pp. 18-19; d.H. 19/3, pp. 178-181; C O . 4893, pp. 265-267, 291-292.
90King to Cloete, 11 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 178-181; King to
Van der Riet, 13 July, 1828, G.H. 19/3, pp. 206-209.
Colonist, 26 August, 1828.
**The Colonist, 19 August, 1828.
23
destroy, and considerable caution 1s therefore requisite In weighing the
evidence only procurable through prejudiced channels; from sources of
this kind the Invader 1s declared a determined, a systematic, and a
practiced plunderer, raising no corn, breeding no cattle, and
procreating no children."
The same reservation was true for King's representation of Shaka, and, indeed,
was widely held.
On the mission's return to Natal, Shaka received the reports of his ambassa-
dors. Including the chronicle of King's deceits and manipulations, as well as the
messages from the British authorities. Incensed by King's duplicity and
foolishness, and anxious that he had come close to provoking the British into
battle, Shaka promptly despatched a member of Farewell's camp, John Cane,
overland to the Cape to affirm his peaceful intentions and his compliance with
British requests. He also asked for an official British agent to the Zulu
kingdom.94 Through Cane Shaka stressed that he "was no longer disposed to molest
the frontier tribes of Caffers" and that his aim was "free Intercourse with the
colony"." The Cape authorities were highly receptive to this latest embassy,
and 1n November, the South African Commercial Advertiser reported Its belief that
the "frightful stories" sometimes told about Shaka were "mere fabrications"."
As far as the Cape was concerned, 1n 1828, Shaka was no monster. Nor, for that
matter, had there been anywhere any suggestion that Natal should be colonised.
Colonist, 19 August, 1828.
8
*Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 133; South African Commercial
Advertiser, 31 December, 1829.
9SReport of Sir Lowry Cole, G.H. 23/9, pp.78-86.
^South African Commercial Advertiser, 15 November, 1828.
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"Shaka" posthumously
Unbeknownst to the South African Commercial Advertiser and Its readers however
both James King, the opportunistic purveyor of rumours of Zulu attack, and Shaka
the king who-was-not-a-monstert were already dead. The former died mysteriously'
on 7 September, and the latter was assassinated on the 24th September. Cobbing
argues on the basis of circumstantial evidence that Fynn and Farewell were behind
the assassination of the Zulu king."' (Jobbing's evidence 1s not conclusive, and
1n his preoccupation with white agency and white sources, he falls to take
account of Zulu oral tradition on the event, 1n which there Is no hint of
Involvement by the traders. Oral traditions are notoriously permeable to such
Information, while Zulu succession practices - which preclude an assassin from
succeeding to the office of his victim - would have placed a high premium on the
revelation by the contenders for the succession of any Involvement by Fynn and
Farewell. It should be noted moreover, that the traders1 response to the
assassination was defensive. They Improved their fortifications at Port Natal,
readied their boat for an emergency departure, and Indeed, Farewell and Isaacs
left soon thereafter for Port Elizabeth.
It was only after the death of Shaka that the traders began for the first
time to talk about colonisation of Natal and to employ a rhetoric critical of
Shaka.88 Their monopoly over the Natal trade which had prevailed since 1824, was
finally coming to an end. Their successful promotion of conditions 1n Natal had
stimulated others to follow in their footsteps." The traders had not yet
established relations with the new Zulu king 1n the way that they had with the
old, and circumstances 1n Natal 1n early 1829 were more volatile and less
predictable than ever before. The traders had attempted repeatedly to make a go
of the Natal trade on their own, and had failed. By 1829, and under these
circumstances, colonisation offered the traders an excellent opportunity for
making good their by now quite considerable losses. It was at this time that
Farewell raised capital against his land grant in expectation of the rapid
development of Port Natal.
The vilification of Shaka that began at this time was as specific to the
conditions which prevailed 1n early 1829, as King's remarks 1n 1826 and early
1828 were specific to his particular circumstances at the time. On his return to
the Cape, Farewell faced accusations that he had fought 1n the Zulu armies - an
allegation not without substance. The thrust of his defence, an argument which
was subsequently taken up by Fynn and Isaacs, was that the traders had been
9?Cobbing, "Grasping the Nettle", pp.28-29.
98See Farewell to Bell, 19 February, 1829, G.H. 19/3, pp.579-580;
Farewell to the Chairman, Committee of the Commercial Exchange, Cape Town, 3
March, 1829, P.R.O., series C O . 48/133; Saxe Bannister to Bell, 28 March,
1829, C O . 3941, pp.403-404, and a host of other applications by Bannister.
Note also the changed tenor of Farewell's communication to Barrow, of 15
March, 1829, P.R.O., series C O . 48/13.
"Bell to Mr. Benjamin Green, 22 August, 1828, CO. 4895, p.350; Green to
Bell, 11 August, 1828, C O . 3937, pp. 323-324; Farewell to Bell, 4 December,
1828, C O . 357, pp.400-401.
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threatened by Shaka and forced to participate 1n the campaigns.'011 At this
point, precisely because the Zulu king was dead, the traders could malign Shaka
to provide an "alibi" for their own actions without threatening the stability of
conditions 1n Natal. In support of their case against Shaka, they drew on a
stock of stories with which they had become acquainted 1n Natal, stories garnered
from African Informants.
Moreover, the traders were also aware that they could no longer monopolise
the image of Shaka that prevailed at the Cape to the extent that they had
previously done. The British authorities had resolved to send the agent
requested by Shaka, and were highly suspicious of the traders. In addition,
numerous other parties 1n the Cape announced their Intention of proceeding north
to the Zulu kingdom.
When these various parties arrived 1n Natal, they found that the Image of
Shaka as a tyrant which was gaining ground 1n the Cape 1n 1829 was strongly
echoed by Zulu society. Shaka-the-monster was no more the "Invention" of the
traders 1n 1829, than 1t had been before that. Nor was a negative view of Shaka
the only Image that prevailed in Zulu society 1n 1829. Resistance to Shaka's
assassin and successor, Dingane, ensured the continuity of positive productions
of Shaka. It is to a brief examination of the various African productions of
Shaka that the next section of this paper turns, so as to challenge another of
Cobbing's generalisations, his view that there 1s, at best, a single "Zulu"
voice, that "it" presented a view of the Zulu past that was essentially unchanged
between 1820 and 1900, if not the present, and that white views of Shaka were
Impervious to that view.
ZULU PRODUCTIONS OF SHAKA IN THE 1820s
Domination and resistance 1n the Zulu kingdom under Shaka
Sometime before about 1820, 1n a controversial accession, Shaka kaSenzagakhona
took over the leadership of the Zulu chiefdom with assistance from the local
paramount power, the Mthethwa. The latter were subsequently defeated by the
Ndwandwe, and, sometime before the first traders arrived at Port Natal, the Zulu
forces, considerably enlargened and reorganised, themselves repulsed an Ndwandwe
attack and ultimately suceeded 1n breaking up the Ndwandwe kingdom. Overnight,
the Zulu became the predominant power 1n the Phongolo-Thukeia region.
When the traders landed at Port Natal 1n 1824, they entered a relatively new
and highly hetereogeneous polity which the new Zulu leaders were 1n the process
of consolidating Into a centralized state. But the process of centralisation was
far from smooth. The new Zulu rulers faced opposition from within the ruling
house that was to culminate 1n the assassination of Shaka 1n 1828. The
disputation within the royal house was, however, overshadowed by the struggle to
assert their hegemony in the wider region, and to maintain Zulu ascendancy over
neighbouring chiefdoms. By the m1d-1820s, Zulu overrule was by no means well-
entrenched. In particular, the Zulu rulers faced rebellion in two of the largest
mSouth African Commercial Advertiser, 27 December, 1828,
31 January, 1829; Farewell's report, G.H. 23/9, pp. 39-47; G.H. 1/15, p. 665.
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chiefdoms subordinate to their rule: amongst the Gwabe In the south, and the
Khumalo 1n the north. Another festering sore was the la la tributaries on the
southern periphery close to Port Natal. Zulu control over these areas was
maintained only with difficulty by a combination of coercive and Ideological
measures. There were thus great Inequalities within the Zulu kingdom, deep-
seated divisions, and great disaffection. Even after the collapse of Khumalo
resistance in 1826, Shaka's position was by no means secure.10'
Ongoing resistance 1n the areas mentioned, and smaller outbreaks of rebellion
elsewhere, prompted continued coercive and Ideological responses from the Zulu
authorities. These Included merciless campaigns, and stern sentences for
Individual rebels. The effect of these actions was to Invest Shaka with a
reputation for harsh and arbitrary action. On the one hand, the Zulu authorities
fostered this Image through carefully managed displays of despotism and brutal
justice at the court, using terror as a basis for absolute rule across a huge
kingdom. The displays were not designed only to Inspire obedience from their
subjects, they were also meant to strike fear Into the heart of their enemies,
and to Impress, the traders with Zulu power.
This despotism was Justified by the other component of Shaka's Image, that of
a leader of tremendous abilities, the great unifier, and the hero 1n battle.
Both components of this Image are present 1n his izibongo. The Zulu king was
reputedly one of the architects of his own representation, collecting praises for
himself that he Hked. According to the Informant Mbokodo kaSokhulekile, Shaka
took for himself the praise "The one whose fame resounds even as he sits", after
he heard it used 1n respect of the Mbo chief, Sambela. Stuart's Informant
Jantshi recalled his father, Nongila, one of Shaka's most trusted spies,
describing the Zulu king as a successful conqueror, but also one who frequently
caused people to be put to death.103 Nongila claimed that Shaka fed people to
the vultures, but linked such acts to the maintenance of authority and discipline
1n the Zulu kingdom.'0* He related how Shaka would cut off a man's ears 1f he
did not listen, i.e. obey, and he would pick out anyone wounded 1n battle and
kill him for being a coward, for running away. But as much as a reputation
for harshness served Shaka's purposes, and was promoted actively by his
supporters, so too did 1t form the basis of opposition to his rule. Gwabe
accounts of Shaka vilUfy him as a tyrant, la la accounts depict him as a marauder
a destroyer, and a "madman", sans caveats about the maintenance of discipline.106
101King to "T", presumably Thompson, 2 May, 1827, in The Colonist. 3
January, 1828.
mJSA, vol.3, p.15, Mbokodo
mJSAt vol.1, p. 195, Jantshi.
mJSA, vol. 1, p. 195, Jantshi.
mJSA, vol. 1, pp. 195, 201-202, Jantshi.
106JSAt vol. 2, p.232, Maquza; vol. 3, pp.55-56, 65-67, Mcotoyi.
27
By 1826, the traders were firmly inserted 1n the Zulu kingdom, and were
closely involved in the extension of Zulu rule south of the Thukela. They
encountered these different views of Shaka 1n a range of contexts such as at his
court in circumstances of his making, or through their independent contacts with
the Qwabe, Khumalo, Cele and Mbo. They also heard reports of Shaka's
depradations from the African community at Port Natal which had previously been
driven from their territories by Shaka.111'
Shaka's supporters and opponents thus shared certain images of the Zulu king,
and contested others. All of these, and the struggles between them, and their
shifting content 1n response to changing conditions, both during the reign of
Shaka, and subsequently, as well as the way in which they intersected with the
views of the Port Natal traders, have been ignored by Cobbing.
Listening for the voices of domination and resistance
Cobbing is oblivious to these processes because he collapses the different,
contending productions into a single "Zulu voice", that, in recorded form, he
conceives of as being contaminated.108 Herein lies the reason for Cobbing's
failure to come to grips with African views of Shaka. For Cobbing, there are
none yet extant. He 1s deaf to the cacophony of conflicting Images of Shaka
contained in sources like the Stuart Archive, for he dismisses them as
fundamentally "tainted" by their recorder. For Cobbing, Stuart, more than any
other single writer, was responsible for the creation of the image of Shaka that
sits at the heart of the mfecane stereotype. The Stuart Archive 1s poisoned not
only by Stuart, but also by earlier white writers of Zulu history who shaped the
range of "historical fantasies" that informed Stuart's approach, and, indeed, 1s
further adulterated by the present editors.10'
Cobbing is guilty of two significant oversights In his evaluation of the
Archive and his discounting of its many Shaka's. The first is that while it is
indeed true that Stuart was an avid Shaka-ophile - who delivered dozens of
lectures in Natal and 1n London on the subject of the Zulu monarch, and who
constantly directed his informants onto the topic of Shaka - the range of variant
opinions 1n their statements, and the extent to which they differ from Stuart's
own versions, are a strong Indications of their integrity.110
1HFynn, Diary, pp.66,65-66, 130; Isaacs, Travels, pp.18, 19, 24-26, 32,
37, 41, 63, 67, 70, 78, 83, 89-90, 140.
10BTh1s view of Zulu oral tradition 1s spelt out at length by Cobbing 1n
a review article on the James Stuart Archive, entitled "A Tainted Well. The
Objectives, Historical Fantasies, and Working Methods of James Stuart, with
Counter-Argument", Journal of Natal and Zulu History, XI (1988), pp.115-154.
109While Cobbing dismisses Stuart's Informants' versions of Shaka, he does
concede that the Archive may yield historical data.
1J0
 Stuart never published published anything on Shaka beyond the accounts
in his four Zulu readers, uBaxoxele, uTulasizwe, uHlangakula and uVusezakiti,
London, 1923-26.
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The great well of bitterness towards Shaka, for example, which permeates the
entire testimony of an Informant like the Qwabe woman, Baleka, was no mere
response to Stuart's promptings. The Qwabe chiefdom was 1n rebellion for much of
the reign of Shaka and was subject to brutal repressive measures. Baieka's
father, Hpitikazi, nearly lost his life at Shaka's hand. Baleka noted the
details of Shaka's persecution of the Qwabe, and recounted a host of gruesome
tales told to her by her father on topics such as the Inhumanity of Shaka, his
wanton cruelty - Including stories of the cutting open of a pregnant woman, and
the feeding of human corpses to the vultures.111 Her judgement of Shaka was
harsh:
That man used to play around with people. A man would be killed though he
had done nothing, though he had neither practised witchcraft, committed
adultery nor stole.
For Mp1t1kaz1 and Baleka, Shaka was best summed up by this one of his praises,
"The violently unrestrained one who 1s like the ear of an elephant".'13 Finally,
for them, Shaka, who refused to father children, and whom they credit with having
killed his own mother for concealing a child of his, was an animal. "A person
like Tshaka 1s like a wild beast, a creature which does not live with Its own
young, Its male offspring. '
Secondly, Cobbing fundamentally misunderstands Stuart when he describes him
as "a representative and influential product of an unpleasant generation", whose
"thought exemplifies the pathologies of colonial society..."'1' In fact,
Investigation of the vast residue of the unpublished Stuart papers - his private
correspondence, draft manuscripts, and his notes to himself - reveals that Stuart
was disenchanted with prevailing "native policies", that he objected to Isibalo
labour levies and the dispossession of people from their land, and that he
evinced a powerful commitment to giving Africans a say 1n their own affairs, to
allowing them to be heard 1n their own words. In significant ways, Stuart was
painfully at odds with the prevailing sentiments of his fellow colonists. In
terms strongly reminiscent of modern scholars concerned with the view "from
below", yet also captive to the discourse of his times, he objected to the
keystone of paternalism:
This question of the contact between the civilized and uncivilized races
receives Its expression almost entirely from the civilized themselves.
The whole controversy 1s an ex parte affair - conducted by the civilized
against one another, instead of by civilized and uncivilized. The
uncivilized man's voice 1s never heard. In any case, 1t cannot be
detected amidst all the Babel of talk that is constantly going on, most
by people who know nothing of the situation as 1t is from the Nat1vefs
Stuart Archive, vol.1, evidence of Baleka, especially pp.7-12.
]nJSA, vol.1, p.12, Baleka.
113JS>4t vol.1, p.8, Baleka.
]HJSAt vol.1, p.8, Baleka.
11sCobb1ng, "Tainted Well", p.120.
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point of view. In a question of this kind surely the voice of the
people primarily concerned 1s of the greatest Importance.1"
Cobbing claims that Stuart's motive for collecting so prodigious a body of oral
tradition was to answer "the central riddle [as to] how ... the native [was] to
be dispossessed of his land, set to work, administered, controlled, set apart,
ordered around, treated as a child, Impoverished, and dehumanised without the
white man (and his wife) having their throats slit", but this takes no account of
the complexity of Stuart's career, nor of the highly contested development of the
Native Policies of the early twentieth century and the tremendous ambiguity of
the positions of their early formulators.
Full Investigation of Stuart 1n such a way as to facilitate a proper reading
of the recorded traditions merits detailed attention and is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, 1t 1s essential that we begin to challenge (Jobbing's
characterisation of Stuart's recording activities, as well as his wholesale
dismissal of African versions of the past.
Cobbing is undoubtedly correct to reiterate Vansina's seminal points
concerning the need for scholars using Information contained in collections of
oral traditions to come to terms with the presences 1n the traditions of the
collector. But, not only 1s Stuart's presence different from the stereotypical
colonial functionary of Cobbing's depiction, the Interests of the recorder of an
oral text are not as all-determining as Cobbing supposes.'" Texts frequently
say things over and above what their authors, their editors, and even their
"collectors" intend. The Informant from whom the tradition 1s recorded
constitutes yet another presence, as do any Interests which the Informant, and/or
the collector intend the text to counter, avoid, or neutralize.
Oral traditions require thus the reconstruction of their own histories. We
need to know under what circumstances the oral text came to be transcribed, and
by whom. We need to know all about the background, interests and experiences of
the transcriber. We also need to know who the Informant was, his/her background,
interests and experiences. We need to establish how he or she gleaned the
information provided, and we need to know all the same things about his/her
sources. On the basis of all this Information we need to make judgements about
the production, its periodisation and its faithfulness in written form to the
oral original. Where transmutations may have crept 1n over time we need to
assess their likely content and scope. Finally, we need also to come to grips
with the stylistic elements of the texts, the way 1n which style changes over
time, as well as with what 1s entailed in the transition from oral to written
form.
Events Internal to the Zulu kingdom were responsible for sharp debates over
Shaka, not merely between his supporters and his detractors during his life time,
but also subsequently as different Zulu interests drew on different Shaka's to
support their actions in new presents. In particular, different versions of
Shaka emerged throughout the nineteenth century at times of succession disputes.
Indeed, any attempt to discover the kinds of views of Shaka that prevailed in the
1UKCAL, Stuart papers, file 42, item xxi.
!1
*See his comments, "Tainted Well", p. 118.
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1820s 1n the Zulu kingdom, must test the oral traditions for subversions or
mutations that occurred subsequently.118
The "frontier Caffers'" production of Shaka. 1827-1828
As early as May 1825, the Cape administration was beginning to wrestle with the
"Fetcanie> problem" - "tribes of savages ... advancing on the frontier of the
colony".119 The first recorded mention of Shaka's Involvement 1n the disturbances
immediately north of the border occurred on 25th July, 1827, when the Landdrost
1n Somerset, W.M. Mackay, Interviewed a "Fetcanie" refugee. The Informant
claimed that his people, the "Masutu" and "Manquana", under "Maheta" and
"Mathiana" were defeated by Shaka, who had seized their cattle. This, the
Informant was reported to have claimed, led his people, the "Fetcanie", to attack
others for their cattle.12 The report of this Interview was subsequently
discussed at the highest level 1n Cape Town, and the agency of Shaka duly
noted.''1 Three weeks later, Lt. Col. Henry Somerset, Commandant of the
Frontier, recorded a conversation he had with the "Tambookie" chief, "Powana",
who asserted that his country was not safe for as long as Shaka continued his
wars against the "Fetcanie".
Chaka is driving these people on and as long as he does I cannot
remain...I heard it [the fact that Shaka was advancing] from the
Fetcanie".1"
There is, as far as I can see, no discernible reason for the officials concerned
to have "invented" the conversations which they recorded so meticulously.'23 In
118For a detailed assessment of the various versions of the life story of
Shaka that occur 1n the Stuart Archive^ and their dating, see my "The
production of Shaka and "the weighing of evidence only procurable 1n
prejudiced channels", paper presented to the Conference on Enlightenment and
Emancipation, Durban, 1989.
l19See Cape Archives, Z.P. 1/1/33 and 1/1/36; C O . 234, pp. 270-271, 672-
687, 691; C O . 233, pp. 400-405; C O . 287, pp.204-218, 224-225, 285-303; C O .
333, pp.18-21, 39; C O . 2692, pp.923-940;. C O . 48887, pp.341-344.
l2llW.M. Mackay to the Chief Secretary of Government, 8 August, 1827, C O .
2693, pp.783-794.
)21Minutes of the Council of Advice, 23 August, 1827, A.C. 2, pp.55-59.
l22Quoted in Somerset to Bourke, 31 August, 1827, C O . 2693, pp.833-835.
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 It was at this time, I.e. 1827, that Thompson's Travels and Adventures
in Southern Africa containing a reprint of James King's description of Shaka
as "a cruel and despotic monster" from the South African Commercial Advertiser
in 1826, was published. By August of that year Travels was being read by Cape
colonial officials and although King's report contained no mention of Zulu
campaigns anywhere near the Colony, it is possible that his tirade intersected
with and reinforced the reports of Shaka as the agent behind the disturbances.
Nonetheless, it is notable that, although in this period the administration's
frontier policy was determined by this identification of Shaka as the cause
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other words, the colonial administration's understanding of Shaka as the agency
behind the disturbances was not, as Cobbing claims, the result of the Natal
traders' propaganda.12* Rather, 1t,,was reported as coming straight out of the
mouths of the "frontier CaffersV"
This paper has shown that before 1829, the Port Natal traders were not trying
"to tempt the British north" as Cobbing has claimed, nor was 1t the case that
between "1825-27, as an aphrodisiac for the scarcely Interested Cape
administrators and merchant houses, a v1ll1ficat1on campaign was unleashed
against Shaka and the Zulu". Shaka-the-monster and "Zulu tyranny" had other
origins. In the 1820s both Images were well-entrenched in the oral traditions of
both Shaka's supporters and his enemies, although 1n different forms. In 1829,
however, following his death, these Images became for the first time the dominant
images in both Cape Town and 1n the Zulu kingdom.
CONCLUSION
History as alibi: alibi as ideology
Cobbing is arguing a familiar case: that 1n South Africa, history is
distorted to cover up past misdeeds and to legitimate conditions 1n the present.
In that form, history becomes a component of the dominant Ideology. The
implication of Cobbing's particular "case" is that this happens 1n a mechanical
and reductionist fashion; that, to paraphrase his argument 1n a bald fashion for
the sake of clarity, ideologues, 1n the guise of early travelers, and later
historians, "invent" the version of the past that best serves white Interests,
and this "Invention" is then Incorporated wholesale Into the dominant ideology.
The argument presented in this paper 1s that like alibis, both histories and
ideologies which are successful resonate 1n a body of'Information known to both
their promoters and those whom they seek to persuade. Moreover, although any one
version of the past may be the best known one, or any one ideology the dominant
one, neither exist independently of other versions or views. Rather, the
struggle between dominant and subordinate ideologies and versions of the past are
part of each one's raison d'etre.
In its drive to assert hegemony therefore, any ruling group has to represent
more than simply Its own corporate Interests, and 1t has to find ways moreover of
universalising the latter. What results then, as Gramsci suggest, is a form of
of the frontier disturbances, the officials concerned did not set any store
by King's report, nor did they adopt anything of King's hysterical rhetoric.
See, for example, Lt. Governor of the Cape, Gen. Richard Bourke to Lord
Viscount Goderich, 15 October, 1827, G.H. 23/8, pp.298-304.
1?<Cobbing, "Hfecane as alibi", p.200.
l2SEven that was recognised in the Cape as "a prejudiced channel". See The
Colonist, 19 August, 1828.
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consent that 1s the product of a real Interchange between rulers and ruled.125
Or as Ernesto Laciau puts 1t:
A class 1s hegemonic not so much to the extent that 1t 1s able to Impose
a uniform conception of the world on the rest of society, but to the
extent that 1t can articulate different versions of the world 1n such a
way that their potential antagonism 1s neutralized.12' [my emphases]
The Intimacy of the relationship between history and Ideology, and the reworking
of the past that 1s entailed, ensures that similar constraints are placed on
history as on the Ideology Itself. New versions of the past, no less than the
Ideologies which they seek to underpin, must articulate different versions of the
past 1n such a way that their potential antagonisms are neutralised, and the
argument 1s convincing. The various elements that make up a version of history
that serves well any particular Ideology must Incorporate and neutralise the
arguments of the opposition. Just as any Ideology 1s always 1n a state of being
struggled over, that 1s, 1s always "1n process", so too 1s the historical account
constantly shifting to take account of the changing terrain of the struggle, the
subtle elaborations and shifts 1n the argument of the opposition.
This paper makes two theoretical points: firstly, that to view history simply
as ideology's handmaiden 1s Inadequate, and secondly, that both history and
ideology are never fixed, they are always 1n flux and contested. In terms of the
making of the mfecane myth, 1t asserts the Importance of Africans as historically
significant producers of the past, and challenges the idea of a massive
conspiracy at work for well over a century 1n the production of the mfecane as a
white alibi.
I26A.Gramsc1, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, London, 1971, 1n
particular pp.198-199, 530, 538, 547.
l2
*E.Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, London, 1977, p. 161.
